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Abstract: Synthesizing relevant experiences inUS and someAsian countries, this article reviews joint development as a value capture strategy
for funding public transit. e review starts from the concept of joint development in transportation, its rationale, and the extent of use. We
then provide a classiﬁcation of joint development models with respect to ownerships and transaction methods. ese models are illustrated
with case examples from multiple countries. Aer that, we assess the eﬃcacy of joint development with a set of criteria for transportation
ﬁnance evaluation, including economic eﬃciency, social equity, revenue adequacy & sustainability, and political & administrative feasibility.
Finally, we conclude and provide recommendations for policy consideration.
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1 Introduction
Transportation systems play a central role in enhancing the
productivity and quality of life. In the United States, funding
for streets, highways, and public transit is provided through
the joint eﬀorts of federal, state and local governments,
with taxation and user fees as primary revenue sources, sup-
plemented by loans, bonds and public-private-partnerships
(Board 2006). In recent decades, the amount of resources al-
located to construct, operate andmaintain transportation sys-
tems has not grown in proportion to increasing needs, lead-
ing to concerns about the adequacy and eﬀectiveness of the
transportation ﬁnance system as it currently exists. A 2007 re-
port by the National Surface Transportation Policy and Rev-
enue Study Commission, Transportation for Tomorrow, sug-
gests that an annual expenditure of at least $225 billion for the
next 50 years will be required to upgrade our existing trans-
portation system to a state of good repair; however, present
spending is only about 40 percent of this amount (Transporta-
tion Research Board 2007). is growing gap has highlighted
the necessity of either signiﬁcantly altering the present system
or ﬁnding viable options to replace it. One such option that
has been increasingly discussed in the United States is value
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capture (Rybeck 2004; Smith and Gihring 2006), which aims
to capture the value of beneﬁts received by property owners
or developers as a result of infrastructure improvements, and
to use these revenues to fund such improvements (Phu 2007;
Stopher 1993). Some studies have demonstrated themethod’s
suitability for ﬁnancing urban transportation improvements
thatmight otherwise be funded by local general revenues such
as property taxes or regressive local sales taxes (Wachs 2003).
A 2009 research report by the University of Minnesota iden-
tiﬁes eight common value capture strategies, including land
value taxes (LVT), tax increment ﬁnance (TIF), special as-
sessment districts (SAD), transportation utility fees (TUF),
development impact fees, negotiated exactions, joint develop-
ment, and air rights (Iacono et al. 2009).
e focus of this article is on joint development, which is
a formal arrangement between the public sector and private
entities such that the private entities share some costs of in-
frastructure improvement or contribute some beneﬁts back to
the public sector based on a mutual recognition of the bene-
ﬁts of such infrastructure improvement (Landis et al. 1991).
Joint development has been used in the United States and in
other countries. e majority of the literature on value cap-
ture focuses on a single case or only on cases from a single re-
gion. Hence information about value capture remains scat-
tered, unorganized, and sometimes confusing, resulting in lit-
tle knowledge accumulation. To facilitate public discussion
and policy consideration of issues related to value capture, this
article reviews joint development practices in public transit ﬁ-
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nance, synthesizing relevant experiences in the United States
and some Asian countries. A caveat of this study is that it
does not provide original quantitative analysis, which will be
needed in future research in order to better evaluate the eﬃ-
cacy of joint development.
e article starts from the concept of joint development
in transportation, its rationale, and the extent of its use. We
thendevelop a classiﬁcation of joint developmentmodelswith
respect to ownership and transaction methods, and illustrate
these models with case examples frommultiple countries. We
review the eﬃcacy of joint development in four categories
of transportation-ﬁnance evaluation criteria, including eco-
nomic eﬃciency, social equity, revenue adequacy and sustain-
ability, and political and administrative feasibility. Finally,
we draw conclusions and provide recommendations for pol-
icy consideration.
2 Joint development concepts and rationale
eNational Council for Urban Economic Development de-
ﬁnes joint development as a public-private partnership de-
signed todecrease the costs of constructingor operatingpublic
transportation improvements through creative public-private
ﬁnancing arrangements (National Council for Urban Eco-
nomic Development 1989). Focusing on public transit, Lan-
dis et al. deﬁne joint development as any formal agreement
or arrangement between a public transit agency and a private
individual or organization that involves either private sector
paying to the public sector or private sector sharing capital
costs with the public sector, in mutual recognition of the en-
hanced real-estate development potential created by using a
public transit facility (Landis et al. 1991). e Sedway Kotin
MouchlyGroupdeﬁnes joint development as real-estate trans-
actions involving the development of private projects using
publicly owned land or air rights (Sedway Kotin Mouchly
Group 1996). Varying in scope and method of collaboration,
these deﬁnitions reﬂect various forms of joint development in
transportation projects.
eoretically, joint development may be applicable to all
types of transportation improvement that lead to higher prop-
erty values or enhanced development potential. However,
most examples in the literature pertain to public transit or
urban roads in high-density development areas, where land
value impacts are easier to identify. e literature shows that
public transit—especially high-speed rail—tends to signiﬁ-
cantly increase property values around stations, while other
areas may suﬀer from negative eﬀects such as pollution, noise
or negative spillover due to redistribution of economic activ-
ities (Cervero and Duncan 2002). Although debate about
whether public transit projects necessarily add value to land
continues, successful cases of joint development in transit have
shown that, at least under certain circumstances, public transit
improvements may create signiﬁcant value that can be recog-
nized by the private sector and, upon recognition, may be par-
tially recaptured through a variety of joint developmentmech-
anisms. is article focuses on transit-related joint develop-
ment mechanisms that can be used to capture such value and
the eﬀects that they may have, should such value be created
and recognized.
Joint development projects are sometimes referred to as
public-private partnerships, but this description is not accu-
rate in all cases. Some types of joint development are public-
private partnerships, for example, when the private sector is
involved in a contractual relationship to jointly ﬁnance pub-
lic transportation. e Federal Highway Administration de-
ﬁnes public-private partnerships as “contractual agreement[s]
formed between public and private sector partners, which al-
low more private sector participation than is traditional” (US
Department of Transportation 2004). In the past, public
transportation projects in theUnited States have been primar-
ily funded by the public sector with governmental revenues,
while the private sector’s role has been largely limited to de-
sign or construction contracts on a fee-for-service basis. Deep
cuts in federal transportation grants and state transportation
funding, however, have forced public agencies to seek out ﬁ-
nancial resources from the private sector to meet the grow-
ing need for transportation investment (Cervero 1992). Op-
tions to increase private contribution, such as joint develop-
ment, are viewed as important ways to decrease project costs,
mitigate public risk, and increase the quality of transporta-
tion infrastructure (USDepartment of Transportation 2004).
Other types of joint development, however, are not necessarily
public-private partnerships; for example, when governments
sell or lease property or development rights to obtain revenues,
when public authorities directly engage in proﬁt-making real
estate development, or when private sector stakeholders are
involved only through direct exchanges such as paying for
adjustments of density standards or usage rights (Center for
Transit Oriented Development 2008).
Joint development is a value capture strategy because pri-
vate beneﬁts created through infrastructure improvements are
partially captured through speciﬁc joint development arrange-
ments to support the initial cost of the improvements. In this
sense, successful joint development projectsmay help alleviate
funding shortages and may improve market eﬃciency by bet-
ter linking costs and beneﬁts of transportation improvements.
Joint development as a value capture strategy for public transit ﬁnance 
3 Extent of use of joint development
e use of joint development in the United States dates back
to the Paciﬁc Railroad Act of 1862, which provided land
grants to the Union Paciﬁc and Central Paciﬁc Railroads for
the construction of the transcontinental railroad. Each rail-
roadwas given 400-foot rights of way plus ten squaremiles for
everymile of track built. e federal government expected the
railroads to sell their acquired land to pay for the transconti-
nental railroad’s construction. However, railroads later turned
to government bonds to pay for the railroad’s construction
(Cox 2009).
As of 2010, regulatory barriers and public opposition have
prevented the widespread use of joint development strate-
gies in the United States, although twenty-three states have
enacted legislation authorizing some types of public-private
partnership. It was not until the passage of the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA) in 1991 that
joint development strategies were permitted for federal-aid
highway projects, and other restrictions remain a signiﬁcant
barrier. Additionally, many states limit the number of joint
development projects or place constraints on the volume of
development (US Department of Transportation 2004). De-
spite these limitations, several public entities have employed
joint development with varying levels of success. In 2004,
NewYorkCity led the nation in the number of transit-related
joint development projects, primarily in the form of density
bonuses provided to developers. On a dollar basis, the Wash-
ington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) col-
lected the most revenue or oﬄoaded the most cost (Cervero
et al. 2004). In addition to New York City and Washington,
D.C., our literature review shows that other cities such as Port-
land,Oregon andPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania also use a variety
of joint development models.
In recent years, joint development applications have be-
come increasingly important in ﬁnancing transit capital
projects such as high-speed rail or bus rapid transit, as well as
in guiding long-term land use patterns. In 2009, theAmerican
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) appropriated $8
billion for “High-Speed Rail Corridors and Intercity Passen-
ger Rail Service” (American Public Transportation Associa-
tion 2011).¹ ARRA also established policy principles encour-
aging state and local governments to consider transit-oriented
development approaches, including joint development, at or
near stations to help support station costs and achieve higher
levels of ridership. Some states had set up related bills even ear-
¹ We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this important pub-
lic policy trend.
lier. For example, the Florida Department of Transportation
developed a “Vision Plan” in 2006 for a statewide high-speed
rail systemwith the potential for $3.5 billion in joint develop-
ment at station sites (Florida Department of Transportation
2006).
Outside the United States, joint development projects are
common in Asian cities. Some widely discussed examples
of joint development include Hong Kong’s “rail-property
(R+P)”model (Cervero andMurakami 2008;Hong and Lam
1998), the “land consolidation” model used in several Tai-
wanese cities (Lam and Tsui 1998) and Tokyo’s “land read-
justment” model (Farrell et al. 1994; Kuranami et al. 2000;
Tsukada and Kuranami 1990). e success of these cases is
due in part to their unique regional contexts, including high
population densities, booming property markets, and favor-
able political, legal, or regulatory environmental toward joint
development. Some of these models are not directly applica-
ble to the United States context. Nonetheless, such interna-
tional examples contribute signiﬁcantly to knowledge build-
ing on joint development and canbroaden thehorizon for pol-
icy considerations in the United States.
4 Joint development mechanisms by ownership
and beneﬁt types
As a general concept, joint development can includemany dif-
ferent models that can be distinguished with respect to trans-
portation modes, organizational structures, funding alloca-
tions or physical arrangements. To facilitate the search for re-
lated policy tools, in this article, we organize joint develop-
ment models in two dimensions: (1) whether related proper-
ties or sites for joint development are owned by the public or
private sector, and (2) whether the transactions are based on
property or development rights (Iacono et al. 2009). We be-
lieve it is important to distinguish ownership features because
public and private property ownership may give rise to dif-
ferent joint development arrangements. We also distinguish
beneﬁt types as the base of joint developmentmechanisms fol-
lowing the value capture framework established in the recent
Minnesota report (Iacono et al. 2009). Along these two di-
mensions, Table 1 presents multiple joint development mod-
els illustrated by selected case studies from cities in theUnited
States and Asia. e table also includes fund usage of these
joint development examples, either for cost sharing or for rev-
enue sharing. We do not use fund usage as a major way to
category joint development models, because cost sharing and
revenue sharing are increasingly interconnected, as the public
sector may borrow money (for example, through municipal
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bonds) and then use future revenue sharing to pay back initial
costs.
4.1 Joint development based on public ownership
Transactions involving publicly owned property
epublic sectormay sell or lease public-owned properties for
funding where the transportation agency owns land adjacent
to its facilities but does not need the property for immediate
use, or where the parcel is not being utilized to its full poten-
tial. e sale of property provides a one-time lump sum pay-
ment which may be used for immediate infrastructure devel-
opment or capital improvements. Alternatively, leasing pub-
licly owned property provides a steady stream of income over
the duration of the lease to oﬀset operating costs or capital im-
provements (Jhonson and Hoel 1985). Leasing also gives the
public agency the freedom to renegotiate rent payments based
on any future increases in property value. Public agencies may
also proactively purchase land in anticipation of a planned in-
frastructure project, “banking” the land until prices appreci-
ate before selling or leasing it for proﬁts. ese proﬁts are
used, in turn, to fund public transportation facilities (Tran-
sit Cooperative Research Program 2002). While the lower
purchase price of land is the primary beneﬁt of this model,
other beneﬁts include the fact that the required parcelsmay be
more easily assembled and the government has more control
over the timing, pace and character of future development sur-
rounding transportation infrastructure (Transit Cooperative
Research Program 2002). Two typical examples of these ap-
proaches in the United States are found inWashington, D.C.,
and Philadelphia.
Land banking by WMATA (Washington, D.C.) eWashington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) uses several
models of joint development to generate revenue for the pur-
poses of maintaining and expanding the agency’s transit in-
frastructure, encouraging transit-oriented development, and
increasing transit ridership (Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority 2008). Speciﬁcally, the agency leases and
sells its property on or adjacent to transit infrastructure, leases
or sells development rights associated with its property, shares
the operational costs of ventilation and heating systems in
transit stations, and charges “connections fees” for retailers
whowant to connect their retail spaces to transit stations. e
agency receives payments from the private sector for property
and development rights in several forms, including one-time
lump sum payments for the purchase of property or develop-
ment rights, annual lease payments, ﬁnancial contributions to
station construction costs, and connection fees from retail-
ers (Cervero et al. 2004; Massey 1999). ese joint develop-
ment projects had generated over $60 million for WMATA’s
operating budget by 1999, and almost $150 million by 2003
(Cervero and Bernick 1997).
Commercial space leasing by SEPTA (Philadelphia) In Philadel-
phia, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Author-
ity (SEPTA) has entered into many cost-sharing arrange-
ments. For example, Philadelphia leases commercial spaces in
suburban rail stations at favorable rates and, in return, the pri-
vate developers maintain and upgrade public concourses and
passageways. Philadelphia transit oﬃcials estimated they had
attracted $2.4 million in private investments for station reha-
bilitation by 1990 (Cervero 1994).
Transactions involving development rights
In thesemethods, a public agency owns land adjacent to its fa-
cilities, and it sells, leases, or awards associated development
rights to encourage development of a site and to generate rev-
enues. e money received by the agency is used for pub-
lic transportation investments, operations and maintenance.
When development rights are leased or sold, private ﬁrms
may use the rights to develop commercial, industrial or res-
idential facilities. Unless there is a proﬁt-sharing agreement
in place between the public and private entities, the private
entity retains the revenue generated from such development.
Hong Kong used this strategy through their R+P model. e
transactions have not only been able to sustain infrastructure
costs but also yield a net return on investment (Cervero and
Murakami 2008; Hong and Lam 1998). When development
rights are awarded, private entities are given the right to re-
cover costs through real estate development in exchange for
developing transit infrastructure. A typical example in the
United States is seen in Portland, Oregon. (Center for Transit
Oriented Development 2008).
Rail-property (R+P) model (Hong Kong) e Metropolitan
Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) of Hong Kong uses a
joint development method they call the rail-property (R+P)
model. Using this model, the MTRC purchases development
rights from the Hong Kong Government (the majority share-
holder of the MTRC) at a “before rail” price, and sells these
rights to a selected developer at an “aer rail” price—which is
signiﬁcantly higher. e diﬀerence between the “before rail”
and “aer rail” prices covers the cost of railway investments. In
this way, the MTRC takes advantage of market-driven prop-
erty appreciation to ﬁnance railway services. e R+P model
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Table 1:Mechanisms of joint development.
Fund Usage
Joint Development Method Examples Cost-
sharing
Revenue-
sharing
Public Ownership:
Property
Sale for funding Land-banking byWMATA (Washington,
D.C.)
X
Lease for funding Commercial space lease by SEPTA
(Philadelphia)
X
Development
rights
Sale for funding Development rights sale (Hong Kong) X
Lease for funding
Development rights lease, Washington, D.C. X
Rail-property model (Hong Kong) X
Exchange for
private contributions
Development rights award (Portland) X
Development rights award (Taipei) X
Private Ownership:
Property
Exaction through
joint development
Land readjustment (Tokyo) X
Land acquisition (Taipei) X
Land consolidation (Taipei) X
Development
rights
Usage adjustments in exchange
for private contributions
Comprehensive plan change (Taipei) X X
Commercial-industrial mixed use (Taipei) X
Density bonus in exchange
for private contributions
Density bonus program (New York City) X X
was used in the development of Maritime Square, which was
planned and managed by the MTRC as a part of the Tsing
Yi Station. eMTRC procured 50-year development rights
for the site and sold the rights at a substantial premium to
underwrite the costs of building the station. A private sector
developer then used the development rights to build residen-
tial towers and a shopping center adjacent to the rail station
(Cervero andMurakami 2008; Hong and Lam 1998).
Development rights award (Portland, OR) e Red
Line/Airport MAX light rail extension in Portland,
Oregon, was built by Bechtel and Trammel Crow (a private
development team) in exchange for the development rights
around Cascade Station. e project involved cooperation
between the development team, the Port Authority of
Portland, the City of Portland, the Portland Development
Commission and TriMet (Portland’s transit agency). As
per the joint development agreement, originally craed in
1999, the development team agreed to take responsibility
for the repayment of $28 million in bonds related to the
construction of a portion of the light rail in exchange for the
right to develop 120 acres surrounding the project (Center
for Transit Oriented Development 2008). e development
consisted mainly of retail and oﬃce space in the surrounding
area. Development stalled for almost four years between 2001
and 2005 due to the real estate downturn aer September 11,
2001. However, since 2005, the area has witnessed signiﬁcant
new development, including several major retailers, oﬃce and
hotel projects (Center for Transit Oriented Development
2008).
4.2 Joint development based on private ownership
Transactions involving privately owned property
A public entity, or a developer working with a public en-
tity, may exact land from private property owners who, in
exchange, receive beneﬁts in the form of property improve-
ments. is model is used extensively in Japan to acquire
land for rail projects and real estate development (Farrell et al.
1994; Kuranami et al. 2000; Tsukada and Kuranami 1990).
In Taiwan, such examples including land acquisition and land
consolidation approaches (Lam and Tsui 1998). In the United
States, there are few joint development examples in this cate-
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gory, probably due to the more extensive restrictions on gov-
ernmental exaction.
Land readjustment (Tokyo) e land readjustment model of
joint development is widely employed in Japan. In this model,
a public or private developer organizes property owners into
a cooperative, which authorizes the developer to develop
the property, returning smaller but fully serviced parcels to
landowners when the development, including transportation
infrastructure projects, is complete. e developer retains a
portion of the new property parcels as compensation for their
development services. Tokyo Corporation, a private railway
operator and real estate developer, completed the Tama Den-
en Toshi development, a planned community serviced by a
rail line, using the land readjustment model. Tokyo Corpora-
tion and its aﬃliated companies then promoted the area’s de-
velopment by selling land, constructing housing, and attract-
ing shopping centers and schools. e project is viewed as
one of the most successful land development initiatives un-
dertaken by a private Japanese company, requiring no direct
government subsidy (Farrell et al. 1994; Kuranami et al. 2000;
Tsukada and Kuranami 1990).
Land acquisition and land consolidation (Taipei) Several cities
in Taiwan have used exaction approaches including land ac-
quisition and land consolidation. In thesemodels, private prop-
erty owners donate a portion of their property to a public en-
tity. e agency improves the acquired properties by provid-
ing, for example, sewer, water, or other utility service. When
the improvements are complete, the public entity returns a
predetermined percentage of the land (40% in Taipei City) to
the original property owners. e land retained by the public
entity is used todevelop various infrastructure facilities such as
roads or transit. Alternatively, the landmay also be retained to
raise money for future infrastructure development (Lam and
Tsui 1998).
Transactions involving development rights
In some cases, private property owners may be willing to con-
tribute in exchange for improved development rights—for ex-
ample, through zoning changes. Two typical examples are
usage adjustments in Taipei, Taiwan, and density bonuses in
New York City.
Usage adjustments (Taipei) Taiwan uses a comprehensive plan
change approach in Taipei and Kaoshiung, where the cities’
comprehensive plans permit developers to apply for zon-
ing changes that increase revenue potential by, for example,
changing the approved land use from residential to commer-
cial. In exchange, the developers are required to contribute
funds or share the costs of transportation infrastructure (Lam
and Tsui 1998). For example, a developer may contribute 30
percent of its property and 12 percent of project costs to the
city, in exchange for a high-density development permit. e
government uses these property gains to oﬀset infrastructure
costs in the area. Alternatively, developers may also petition
for the establishment of industrial-commercial mixed-use dis-
tricts, a joint development model wherein special permits al-
low thehigh-intensity use of urban andnon-urban land. ese
permits require a contribution of land as well as cost sharing.
For example, a developer may be required to contribute 30
percent of their land within a mixed-use district to the gov-
ernment, plus 12 percent of the infrastructure-related devel-
opment costs (Lam and Tsui 1998).
Densitybonuses (NewYorkCity) eprimary formof joint de-
velopment in the City of New York is the Density Bonus Pro-
gram, started in 1972. e city oﬀers zoning bonuses to de-
velopers that agree to improve subway entrances and to incor-
porate entrances in other developments. ese bonuses may
increase a developer’s Floor Area Ratio (FAR), or the amount
of square footage they can develop, by up to 20 percent, allow-
ing the developer to add several ﬂoors to a new building and
signiﬁcantly increase its revenue potential. Typical improve-
ments include pedestrian passageway upgrades, air circulation
enhancements, landscaping investments or the removal of ac-
cessibility barriers for people with disabilities (Cervero et al.
2004). Such arrangements allow the City of NewYork to save
money on subway construction and in return allow the devel-
opers to build at densities that would usually not be permitted
in the zone (Massey 1999).
5 Evaluating joint development as a transit
ﬁnance strategy
is study seeks to provide a systematic evaluation of the eﬃ-
cacy of joint development as a value capture strategy for public
transit ﬁnance. In public ﬁnance literature, revenue or ﬁnance
options are oen evaluated with a common set of criteria
such as eﬃciency, equity, adequacy and transparency (Mike-
sell 2006; Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). Such practices
have been employed to evaluate transportation ﬁnance op-
tions. For example, the 2006 report by the National Cooper-
ative Highway Research Program (NCHRP), Future Options
to Meet Highway and Transit Needs, utilizes the following cri-
teria: equity, economic eﬃciency, yield, cost/administrative
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feasibility, technical feasibility and political acceptability (Na-
tional CooperativeHighway Research Program 2006). In this
article, we organize relevant criteria into four categories: (1)
economic eﬃciency; (2) social equity; (3) revenue adequacy
and sustainability; and (4) political and administrative feasi-
bility. ese criteria are illustrated with sample research ques-
tions in Table 2. Using this framework to synthesize related
literature and experiences about joint development, we hope
to identify key policy issues that are relevant to joint develop-
ment, to highlight key research questions for further empirical
inquiry, and to provide a common ground for comparing joint
development with other transportation ﬁnance options.
5.1 Economic eﬃciency
e increased land value associated with proximity to tran-
sit development to support transit improvements, joint devel-
opment links the costs of infrastructure development to the
windfall beneﬁts realized by private property owners or devel-
opers (Doherty 2004;Hagman andMisczynski 1978; Stopher
1993). Unlike typical governmental taxation schemes that
may distort consumer behavior and thus reduce economic ef-
ﬁciency, joint development may improve economic eﬃciently
by providing more accurate price signals for societal marginal
costs and beneﬁts of transit improvement through internaliz-
ing its positive externalities.
Joint development models may have advantages over tra-
ditional project delivery due to the interaction of cost shar-
ing and beneﬁt sharing. On one hand, joint development
reduces public-sector inputs through collaboration with the
private sector. By tapping into private sector resources, the
public sector can share project-related risk, access private ﬁ-
nancing, take advantage of private sector expertise and inno-
vation, or achieve scale economies, all of which reduce public-
sector investment in infrastructure and allow the construction
of projects that would not have been implemented otherwise
(US Department of Transportation 2004). For example, the
proceeds of joint development agreements inHongKonghave
not only paid for the entire cost of projects, but have gener-
ated additional funds used to retire pre-existing debt (Cervero
and Murakami 2008; Hong and Lam 1998). On the other
hand, joint development may promote local economic devel-
opment, because infrastructure improvements increase com-
mercial activity through enhanced accessibility and agglom-
eration economies. In Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, joint
development projects around transit stations have generated
higher fare revenue by increasing transit trips as a result of the
services clustered in the areaCervero (1992). Areas with joint
development projects have also been found to have lower va-
cancy rates, higher average building densities, and larger shares
of regional growth than equivalent areas without joint devel-
opment projects Cervero (1994). e corresponding increase
in employment, business growth, and improved accessibility
facilitate economic development. WMATA’s joint develop-
ment projects represent public-private investment of $4 bil-
lion, whichhas created 25000 jobs in theWashington area and
triggered $15 billion of new, unrelated private development
(Massey 1999; Transit Cooperative Research Program 2002).
Nevertheless, joint development tends tobe associatedwith
higher transaction costs. e planning and coordination nec-
essary for a successful joint development project require a sig-
niﬁcant time investment both in setting appropriate policies
before a project is to begin, and in managing the implementa-
tion phase. is is particularly relevant where the public and
private sectors have not previously collaborated on joint de-
velopment projects. When partnerships are new, they may
increase workloads in the public sector, as employees seek to
put in place procedures that guarantee a project’s timeliness,
eﬃciency and safety. Alternatively, the private sector may
also struggle to understand the joint development bidding and
project coordination processes, lengthening the time required
to negotiate, plan and execute these projects (USDepartment
of Transportation 2004). Lack of planning or communication
between project partners can result in project failure. For ex-
ample, the Bangkok elevated rail and transit system was not
completed because neither partner met predetermined expec-
tations (Kuranami et al. 2000).
5.2 Social equity
We evaluate equity from three perspectives. First, we apply
the beneﬁt-received principle to assess the extent to which indi-
vidual payments are related to the beneﬁts that are received by
them. Second, we apply the ability-to-pay principle to exam-
ine how the burden joint development contributions is dis-
tributed across groups with diﬀerent income levels. Finally,
we discuss geographic equity issues associated with individuals
living in diﬀerent locations.
The beneﬁt-received principle e beneﬁt-received principle
dictates that those who beneﬁt from a public project should
pay for it. Economists assume that joint development is a
relatively equitable ﬁnancing mechanism, since joint devel-
opment projects are structured through a market-driven pro-
cess that requires the public and private sectors to come to an
agreement as to what beneﬁts and costs will be traded. Private
developers receive beneﬁts that they agree are in proportion to
their contribution to the project. ose who do not want to
       .
Table 2: Evaluation criteria for transportation ﬁnance strategy.
Criterion Sample uestions
Economic eﬃciency • Is the cost to contributors related to the beneﬁt they receive?
• Will it provide price signals or incentifves for travelers’ behavior, priority of
investment, or governmental decisions?
• To what extent might it hinder economic development?
Social Equity Beneﬁt equity • Is it fair to contributors in terms of the beneﬁts they receive?
• Are there issues of equity by geographic areas?
• Are there concerns of inter-generational equity?
Ability-to-pay equity • How closely does it relate to capacity-to-pay?
• Is it regressive or progressive for diﬀerent income groups?
Geographic equity • Is there a mismatch of beneﬁts and costs for people in diﬀerent areas?
Revenue adequacy and
sustainability
Adequacy • Is the revenue base broad or narrow?
• Is the (implicit) tax rate high or low?
• Howmuch revenue can it raise?
• Would it be enough to replace traditional sources of revenue?
Growth potential • To what extent can the revenue catch up with income growth?
• To what extent can the revenue catch up with inﬂation?
• To what extent can the revenue catch up with need increases?
Stability • How volatile is the revenue?
• Is it cyclical or counter-cyclical?
Predictability • Is the revenue easily predictable?
Political and
administrative
feasibility
Political feasibility • Is the tax or fee visible to taxpayers or the public?
• Is the tax or fee transparent in its adoption, implementation and tax burden?
• Would it incur any tax exportation?
• What is the common perception by developers and the public?
• Are there speciﬁc obstacles in the current rule and regulations?
Administrative
feasibility
• Administrative cost: How diﬃcult is it to manage the process?
• Compliance cost: Is it diﬃcult for the public to comply with the policy?
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participate in a joint development project do not do so. How-
ever, some forms of joint development have been criticized for
their distribution of beneﬁts. For example, theTaiwanese gov-
ernment has encountered opposition from property owners
whenusing its land consolidationmodel of joint development,
primarily because land owners do not believe that they receive
suﬃcient compensation for giving a portion of their land to
the government (Lam and Tsui 1998).
ere may be situations in which certain contributors dis-
proportionately beneﬁt from joint development. Concerns
have been raised about the extent to which joint development
agreements beneﬁt the private sector at the expense of taxpay-
ers. Some states have regulations that limit the timely distri-
bution of information about joint development agreements,
thus avoiding a full public review process and reducing over-
all transparency. While these arrangements are not common,
localities should cra joint development agreements to ensure
that the interests of both the public andprivate sectors are pro-
tected.
The ability-to-pay principle Evaluating equity from an “abil-
ity to pay” perspective measures the extent to which joint de-
velopment is progressive, proportional or regressive by com-
paring eﬀective tax burdens for diﬀerent income classes. In
many cases, joint development may be progressive because
many properties or related development rights adjacent to
transportation improvement sitesmay be owned or controlled
by members of high-income groups, who would have gained
more windfall beneﬁts if the joint development project had
been funded by the government. However, the vertical equity
of a joint development project is determined by the unique
circumstances of the joint development agreement. Such a
project could become regressive if it disproportionately ben-
eﬁts private developers, or if the developers are able to pass a
larger percentage of their costs on to middle- or low-income
consumers.
The geographic perspective ere are several geographic eq-
uity concerns regarding transit development in general, aswell
as speciﬁc joint developmentmodels, because suchprojects of-
ten produce mismatches of beneﬁts and costs whereby peo-
ple living in certain areas subsidize those living elsewhere.
On one hand, most transit systems cannot generate suﬃcient
fare revenues from direct transit users to cover their oper-
ating and maintenance costs, and thus rely upon other rev-
enue sources such as federal grants, local property taxes or ear-
marked special revenues. In the case of local property taxes,
for instance, the beneﬁts of speciﬁc transit lines or stations
are enjoyed mostly by users adjacent to those facilities but are
supported by taxpayers across the whole jurisdiction. On the
other hand, empirical studies across theUnited States and Eu-
ropean counties suggest that economic beneﬁts of rail transit
investment are likely to be redistributive within a region (Ban-
ister andBerechman2000;Cervero andLandis 1997;Hanson
andGiuliano2004). While residents in certain locations, such
as traditional city centers or areas around popular stations, see
great land development impacts, residents in other locations
may suﬀer from nuisance eﬀects such as pollution or noise, or
negative economic spillovers due to the loss of economic ac-
tivities to other locations.
5.3 Revenue adequacy and sustainability
Joint development has proven to be a signiﬁcant source of
project funding in some international cases. In Japan and
Hong Kong, adjacent real estate development fully funds the
cost of infrastructure development and ongoing operations
(Cervero andMurakami 2008; Farrell et al. 1994). InVancou-
ver, the local transit authority plans to replicate a similar joint
developmentmodel by launching a real estate division thatwill
purchase land along new rapid transit routes, increase the in-
tensity of the property’s zoned land use, and then sell and lease
the land to private real estate developers at a higher price. In
doing so, they hope to produce up to $1.5 billion in revenue
over the next ten years to fund the development of new transit
lines (Shore 2008).
However, methods that are more commonly used in the
United States—such as the lease or sale of public property,
or the use of density bonuses to generate revenue—generally
provide a smaller portion of total project ﬁnancing (Stopher
1993). Moreover, negative public opinion in the United
States may also reduce public entities’ ability to use joint de-
velopment as a revenue generating strategy. For example, in
Washington, D.C., WMATA posits that their joint develop-
ment eﬀorts are not hampered by market demand but by the
public’s suspicion that joint development will not beneﬁt tax-
payers (Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
2005). As a result of these factors, joint development is most
oen used as a supplemental ﬁnancing source in the United
States.
Besides property-based private contribution, joint develop-
ment of transit projects may increase fare revenues by increas-
ing transit ridership. In a study of nine transit joint develop-
ment projects in the United States, Keefer (1983) found that
every 1000 square feet of new commercial space near a rail sta-
tion generated an additional six transit trips a day. is yielded
an additional $11.4 million (in 1982 dollars) in annual fare
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box receipts across the nine projects, ranging from $56 000 in
Santa Ana, California to $5 000 000 in Philadelphia.
e predictability of revenue from joint development
projects depends on the structure of the payment stream.
Most joint development models require that both public and
private contributions be predetermined. For example, when a
public entity sells or leases property that it owns, its revenues
are determined through legally enforceable lease or purchase
agreements. In contrast, alternative sources such as the fed-
eral fuel tax have becomemore volatile as ﬂuctuations in gaso-
line prices reduce demand and result in lower revenue collec-
tion (Board 2006). Moreover, a one-time lump sum payment
will be relatively more predictable than a series of future lease
payments. For example, some private developers have oﬀered
large one-time payments in exchange for long-term property
or development rights leases. In a long-term payment struc-
ture, future payments could be jeopardized if the commercial
or real estate markets weaken.
Two factors determine the revenue stability of joint devel-
opment. First, the level of demand for the transportation fa-
cility may aﬀect the amount of revenues collected, if the rev-
enue streams are tied to ridership or traﬃc volume (Landis
et al. 1991). Second, economic conditions may aﬀect the suc-
cess of surrounding real estate developments close to trans-
portation improvements. For example,WMATAagreed to be
compensated through a lease agreement that provided them
a portion of proﬁts derived from related condominium sales
(Massey 1999). During themid-1990s, real estate appreciated
in value and thus the lease agreement provided a stable return
on WMATA’s investment. Such arrangements may yield less
stable income streams during periods of economic volatility.
However, the demonstrated ﬂexibility of joint development
shows that joint development revenues can be structured to
keep up with inﬂation if the contributions from the private
sector are amortized over the life of the project. Likewise, if
a one-time lump sum payment is deemed desirable, the pub-
lic entity should negotiate a payment that considers the time
value of money and the impact of inﬂation.
5.4 Political and administrative feasibility
Joint developmentmay bemore politically acceptable than tax
increases, as the visibility of the approach as a source of pub-
lic revenue is relatively low. Nevertheless, as shown by exam-
ples in the United States and Taiwan, joint development may
invoke public opposition if the ﬁscal arrangements are con-
sidered unfair to the general public. Opinions from schol-
ars and practitioners are divided. Some see joint develop-
ment as a cost-eﬀective strategy that makes eﬃcient use of
public and private resources, while others view it with suspi-
cion, in that the public and private sectors may exploit the de-
velopment of transportation facilities to obtain unfairly large
beneﬁts (MetropolitanWashingtonCouncil of Governments
2005; US Department of Transportation 2004).
In addition, political feasibility heavily depends upon the
structure of regional and local institutions. Joint develop-
ment has been used more oen in some Asian states, prob-
ably because these governments are allowed more ﬂexibility
in intervening or directly participating in the land and prop-
erty market. In the United States, joint development con-
tinues to face institutional and political barriers, in part be-
cause of widespread public concerns that such deals might
be structured to beneﬁt private interests at the expense of
the public (National Council for Public-Private Partnerships
2003). Political concerns may also be raised if the use of joint
development alters project development planning or priori-
ties. Private sector interest in joint development oen fo-
cuses on projects with the greatest revenue potential, neglect-
ing projects that provide smaller revenue opportunities or that
entail higher risk (Kuranami et al. 2000). As a result, trans-
portation infrastructure development may become inconsis-
tent or uncoordinated across modes or systems.
Joint development is administratively challenging, as it re-
quires a higher level of coordination between public and pri-
vate partners than traditional project delivery. A lack of coor-
dination ended the Hopewell Holdings development project
to create an elevated road and train system in Bangkok, ai-
land, when the public and private partners failed tomeet each
other’s expectations (Kuranami et al. 2000). In most cases,
however, related transaction costs are far less than the over-
all cost savings generated from public-private collaboration,
which can reduce the amount of time necessary to complete
a project and enhance the public sector’s access to technical
expertise (US Department of Transportation 2004). As a re-
sult, many transit authorities—including those in Washing-
ton, D.C., New York City and Atlanta—have found joint de-
velopment to be a worthwhile source of revenue.
6 Conclusions and recommendations
To summarize, joint development is a formal arrangement be-
tween public and private entities in which the private sector
stakeholders either pay the public sector stakeholders directly
or agree to share capital costs of development with the pub-
lic sector stakeholders, in mutual recognition of the enhanced
real-estate development potential created by the infrastruc-
ture improvement (Landis et al. 1991). Joint development is
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a value capture strategy because the agreement partially cap-
tures the private beneﬁts created through infrastructure im-
provements.
Joint development encompasses many distinct models,
which we categorize in two dimensions: (1) whether related
properties or sites for joint development are owned by the
public or private sector, and (2) whether the transactions are
based on property or development rights. If the public sec-
tor is allowed to own or purchase adjacent oﬀ-site properties
prior to transit improvement, the governmentmay sell or lease
these properties aer their values have been increased by tran-
sit improvement. Alternatively, the government may lease or
award development rights to the private sector in exchange for
revenues or other private contributions. For privately owned
properties, public sector entities may be able to acquire not
only rights-of-way but also some oﬀ-site parcels through ne-
gotiated exactions. Alternatively, the government may allow
the private sector to havemore proﬁtable usage of the adjacent
properties in exchange for revenues or other private contribu-
tions.
We assess the eﬃcacy of joint development with a common
set of criteria for transportation ﬁnance evaluation. Joint de-
velopment is, in general, economically eﬃcient because it re-
duces public-sector investment in infrastructure, and it may
promote local economic development due to enhanced acces-
sibility and agglomeration economies. But it tends to involve
higher transaction costs in project planning and coordination.
Joint development improves beneﬁt-received equity because
it links the costs of infrastructure development to the wind-
fall beneﬁts of private property owners. It can be either pro-
gressive or regressive depending on speciﬁc contexts and ac-
tual arrangements. Joint developmentmay raise concerns over
geographic equity, as it may incur mismatch of beneﬁts and
costs for people living in diﬀerent localities. Examples from
outside the United States have shown that joint development
can be a signiﬁcant source of project funding. In the United
States, however, joint development generally provides only a
small proportion of total project ﬁnancing, in part due to reg-
ulatory barriers and political opposition to use such market-
orientedmechanisms in infrastructure development. Joint de-
velopment is more politically acceptable than tax increases,
but it may invoke public opposition if the ﬁscal arrangements
are perceived to be unfair. e political acceptability of joint
development also depends upon its regional and local institu-
tional structure. Joint development is administratively chal-
lenging, as it requires a higher level of coordination between
public and private partners than traditional project delivery
mechanisms.
Overall, joint development can be a useful strategy for tran-
sit ﬁnance, but its usage and eﬃcacy depend upon speciﬁc
regional contexts and detailed arrangements. A comparison
with examples in other countries indicates that the potential
of joint development has not been fully realized in theUnited
States, in part due to regulatory and political obstacles to non-
traditional project ﬁnance and delivery mechanisms.
To facilitate the use of joint development in transit ﬁnance,
we provide several recommendations for policy consideration
and future research. First, state governments should adopt
speciﬁc authorization and guidelines for the use of joint de-
velopment. In many places, public agencies are still forbid-
den to participate in development activities cannot purchase
land, or are subject to internal policies (such as parking re-
quirements) that limit their ability to engage in joint devel-
opment (Cervero et al. 2004). In many cases, these policies
were created before joint development was widely used. ey
should be reviewed and revised to allow for the appropriate
use of joint development.
Second, local governments should be encouraged to in-
tegrate transit joint development possibilities in their long-
term comprehensive plans. A variety of joint development
arrangements could be designed, following cohesive policies
that maintain local land use and planning goals (Cervero
1992; Smith and Gihring 2006; Urban Land Institute with
Gladstone Associates 1979). is may avoid the practice, for-
merly common, of governments haphazardly granting zoning
exceptions andbonuses for developer-drivenprojects. In addi-
tion, governments should consider a long-term time horizon
in using joint development to capture the value of their trans-
portation investments, as a signiﬁcant period of time may be
required for the beneﬁts of transit improvements to be fully
realized. Some joint development mechanisms, for example
“land banking” as used byWMATA,must be planned and im-
plemented before transit improvement projects are initiated.
Other mechanisms, such as “usage adjustments” or “density
bonuses”, can be initiated later. Private revenues or contribu-
tions can be structured as long-term payment streams that ac-
count for inﬂation, or as one-time payments that consider the
time value of money in calculating future beneﬁts.
Finally, more research is in order to understand various
joint development mechanisms and their eﬀects in diﬀerent
contexts. A rich body of literature already exists on the eﬀects
of transit development on land value, but much less is known
about mechanisms to be used to capture these value. Policy
scholars should continue to examine joint development expe-
riences in the United States and other countries in order to
identify various types of joint development, and to study their
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eﬀects in diﬀerent legal, political and economic contexts. In
addition, more studies should be conducted on public per-
ceptions of transit joint development—from the policy dis-
cussion stage through implementation and aer project deliv-
ery—because public understanding and acceptance are key to
the successful usage of joint development in transit ﬁnance.
References
American Public Transportation Association. 2011. High-
speed rail investment background data. Technical report,
American Public Transportation Association (APTA).
Banister, D. and J. Berechman. 2000. Transport Investment
and Economic Development. London andNew York: Rout-
ledge.
Board, T.R. 2006.e fuel tax and alternatives for transporta-
tion funding. Technical report, Committee for the Study of
the Long-Term Viability of Fuel Taxes for Transportation
Finance.
Center for Transit Oriented Development.
2008. Capturing the value of transit.
URL http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/
resource-center/books-and-reports/2008/
capturing-the-value-of-transit-3/.
Cervero, R. 1992. Land market impacts of urban rail transit
and joint development: An empirical study of rail transit in
washington, d.c. and atlanta. UCTCWorking Paper 135,
University of California Transportation Center, Berkeley.
URL http://www.uctc.net/papers/135.pdf.
Cervero, R. 1994. Rail transit and joint development: Land
market impacts inWashington, D.C. and Atlanta. Techni-
cal Report 1. doi: 10.1080/01944369408975554.
Cervero, R. andM. Bernick. 1997. Transit Villages for the 21st
Century. McGraw-Hill.
Cervero, R. and M. Duncan. 2002. Transit’s value-added ef-
fects: Light and commuter rail services and commercial
land values. Transportation Research Record, 1805:8–15.
Cervero, R. and J. Landis. 1997. Twenty years of the Bay Area
Rapid Transit system: Land use and development impacts.
Transportation Research Part A, 31(4):309–333.
Cervero, R. and J. Murakami. 2008. Rail and property de-
velopment in Hong Kong: Experiences, impacts and ex-
tensions. Technical report, Lincoln Institute of Land Pol-
icy. URL http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/download.
asp?doc_id=706&pub_id=1388.
Cervero, R. et al. 2004. Transit-oriented development in
the United States: Experiences, challenges, and prospects.
TCRPReport 102, TransitCooperativeResearchProgram.
URL http://pubsindex.trb.org/view/2004/M/705110.
Cox, T. 2009. Collectible stocks and bonds from north amer-
ica. http://www.coxrail.com/land-grants.htm.
Doherty, M. 2004. Funding public transport develop-
ment through land value capture programs. Technical re-
port, Institute for Sustainable Futures. URL http://www.
ecotransit.org.au/ets/reports_submissions_index.
Farrell, S., S. Tsukada, andC.Kurawami. 1994. ValueCapture:
e Japanese Experience.
Florida Department of Transportation. 2006. Florida
Intercity Passenger Rail Vision Plan. URL
http://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/
Documents/APTA_HSR_Investment_Paper.pdf.
Hagman,D. andD.Misczynski. 1978.Windfalls forWipeouts.
American Society of Planning Oﬃcials.
Hanson, S. and G. Giuliano, eds. 2004. e Geography of Ur-
ban Transportation. New York: e Guilford Press.
Hong, Y.-H. and A. H. S. Lam. 1998. Opportunities and
risks of capturing land values under Hong Kong’s lease-
hold system. Technical report, Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy. URL http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/download.
asp?doc_id=24&pub_id=65.
Iacono, M., D. Levinson, Z. Zhao, and A. Lari. 2009. Value
capture for transporation ﬁnance: Report to theminnesota
legislature. Technical report, Center for Transportation
Studies, University of Minnesota.
Jhonson, G. T. and L. A. Hoel. 1985. An inventory of value
capture techniques for transportation. Technical report,
University of Virginia.
Keefer, L. 1983. A review of nine UMTA assisted joint de-
velopment projects. Technical report, US Department of
Transportation.
Kuranami, C., B. P. Winston, K. Kimura, and C. Rose. 2000.
Study on urban transport development. Final report, e
World Bank.
Lam, A. H. S. and S. W. Tsui. 1998. Policies and mechanisms
on land value capture: Taiwan case study. Techni-
cal report, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. URL
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/download.asp?doc_id=
85&pub_id=144.
Landis, J., R. Cervero, and P. Hall. 1991. Transit joint devel-
opment in the USA: Inventory and policy assessment. En-
vironment and Planning, 9(4):431.
Massey, S. E. 1999. Privatizing MTA services, cost savings or
political buzzword? Report, Permanent Citizens Advisory
Committee to the Metropolitan Transit Authority (New
York). URL http://pcac.org/reports/pdf/privpapr.pdf.
Joint development as a value capture strategy for public transit ﬁnance 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. 2005.
WMATA vision and need for dedicated funding. Tech-
nical report, Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments. URL http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/
committee-documents/s11XVlY20041130072828.pdf.
Mikesell, J. 2006. Fiscal Administration: Analysis andApplica-
tions for the Public Sector. Wadsworth Publishing, 7 edition.
Musgrave, R. A. and P. B. Musgrave. 1989. Public Finance in
eory and Practice. Mcgraw-Hill College.
National Cooperative Highway Research Program. 2006. Fu-
ture ﬁnancing options to meet highway and transit needs.
Technical Report NCHRP 20-24(49), National Coopera-
tive Highway Research Program (NCHRP).
National Council for Public-Private Partnerships. 2003. Crit-
ical choices: e debate over public-private partnerships
and what it means for America’s future. Technical report,
National Council for Public-Private Partnerships.
National Council for Urban Economic Development. 1989.
Moving towards joint development-transit partnership.
Report, UrbanMass Transit Administration.
Phu, N. T. 2007. Value capturing: A realistic fund-
ing source for urban transportation in Ho Chi Minh
City? In Submitted to 15th annual Conference on Pa-
ciﬁc Basin Finance, Economics, Accounting and Manage-
ment. URL http://centerforpbbefr.rutgers.edu/2007/
Papers/096-Nguyen%20Thien%20Phu%20Paper.doc.
Rybeck, R. 2004. Using value capture to ﬁnance infrastruc-
ture and encourage compact development. Technical re-
port, Public Works Management Policy 2004. URL http:
//pwm.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/4/249.
Sedway Kotin Mouchly Group. 1996. Joint development en-
trepreneurial study. Report, San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit District.
Shore, R. 2008. Translink’s $1.5 billion real es-
tate empire. Vancouver Sun, 8 March. URL
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/news/
recent-articles/04-08/article-shore.pdf.
Smith, J. J. and T. A. Gihring. 2006. Financing transit sys-
tems through value capture: An annotated bibliography.
Technical report, Victoria Transport Policy Institute. URL
http://www.vtpi.org/smith.pdf.
Stopher, P. R. 1993. Financing urban rail projects: e case
of Los Angeles. Transportation, 20(3):229–250. doi:
10.1007/BF01098928.
Transit Cooperative Research Program. 2002. Transit-
oriented development and joint development in theUnited
States: A literature review. Research Results Digest 52,
Transportation Research Board.
Transportation Research Board. 2007. Transportation for To-
morrow: Report of the National Surface Transportation Pol-
icy andRevenue StudyCommission. National Surface Trans-
portation Policy and Revenue Study Commission. URL
http://transportationfortomorrow.org/final_report/.
Tsukada, S. and C. Kuranami. 1990. Value capture with inte-
grated urban rail and land development: e Japanese expe-
rience and its applicability to developing countries. In Pro-
ceedings of SeminarMheld at thePTRCTransport andPlan-
ning SummerAnnualMeeting: Uniersity of Sussex (Volume
P339).
Urban Land Institute with Gladstone Associates. 1979. Joint
Development: Making the Real Estate-Transit Connection.
Washington: Urban Land Institute.
USDepartment of Transportation. 2004. Report toCongress
on public private partnership. Technical report, Federal
Highway Administration.
Wachs, M. 2003. Local option transportation taxes: Devolu-
tions as a revolution. State Tax Notes, 28(4).
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 2008.
WMATA Joint Development Policies and Guidelines.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. URL
http://www.wmata.com/pdfs/business/Guidelines%
20Revision11-20-08.pdf.
